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Abstract
We consider a simple model of firm/city/etc. growth based on a multi-item criterion: whenever
entity B fares better that entity A on a subset of M items out of K, the agent originally in A
moves to B. We solve the model analytically in the cases K = 1 and K → ∞. The resulting
stationary distribution of sizes is generically a Zipf-law provided M > K/2. When M ≤ K/2,
no selection occurs and the size distribution remains thin-tailed. In the special case M = K, one
needs to regularise the problem by introducing a small “default” probability φ. We find that the
stationary distribution has a power-law tail that becomes a Zipf-law when φ → 0. The approach
to the stationary state can also been characterized, with strong similarities with a simple “aging”
model considered by Barrat & Me´zard.
1
INTRODUCTION
Among all power-law distributions, the Zipf law appears to play a special role. Mathe-
matically, the Zipf law corresponds to a marginally (logarithmically) divergent first moment
– distributions decaying faster have a finite mean, while distributions decaying slower have
an infinite mean. Empirically, this law appears to hold in a variety of situations, from the
frequency of words to the node degree of the Internet [1, 2], the size of companies [3] or the
population of cities [4, 5]; for reviews see [5, 6]. Correspondingly, there has been a flurry of
possible explanation for the ubiquitous Zipf law. One standard explanation for the Zipf law
is based on stochastic multiplicative growth, which under relatively mild assumptions (weak
redistribution between entities and/or total mass conservation) can be shown to converge
towards a Zipf distribution [4, 5, 7]. More recently, Gualdi & Mandel [8] and Axtell [9] have
proposed a different mechanism in the context of company sizes, based on the idea that
larger firms are more “attractive” than smaller firms, and individual agents tend to switch
from small firms to large firms.
Inspired by these ideas, we propose here a schematic model where agents randomly select
over time better and better items, possibly using multiple criteria. For definiteness, we
will think about firms, but other interpretations are possible. We postulate that each firm
i is characterized by a set of K attributes, with scores xi ∈ [0, 1]K that all agents agree
on. For instance, xi1 is the score given to the wages paid by firm i, x
i
2 the score given to
its location, xi3 the score given to its work environment, etc. Firm j is deemed “better”
than firm i when the number of attributes for which j has a higher score than i exceeds
M (with 1 ≤ M ≤ K). In the single criterion case K = 1, we find that the stationary
distribution of firm sizes is a Zipf distribution when the reset rate tends to zero. Other
power-laws are possible, depending on the specific search mechanism. In the multi-criterion
case, we show that the asymptotic distribution is a truncated Zipf law as soon as M > K/2
(up to logarithmic corrections when K > 1), with a diverging cutoff in the limit K → ∞,
M/K > 1/2. For M ≤ K/2, there is no “condensation” and hence no power-law tails, as
expected.
2
THE SINGLE CRITERION MODEL
Greedy algorithm
We first consider the case K = 1. Each firm i = 1, . . . , N is characterized by a single
score xi ∈ [0, 1]. Firms are populated with agents; the fraction of agents belonging to firm i
at time t is denoted ni(t). At each time infinitesimal step dt, an agent is chosen at random
with probability Γdt; s/he picks at random a firm among the ones that are “better” than the
firm s/he presently works for, and moves to the newly chosen firm. We consider from the
outset the limit N → ∞ and assume without loss of generality that the xi are distributed
uniformly in [0, 1]. (One can always transform any chosen distribution of x into the uniform
one by a change of variable that preserves the ordering of the scores.) We also choose to
label firms by their score xi rather than by i, and describe the system at time t by the
function n(x, t) such that the fraction of agents belonging to firms with score between x and
x+dx is n(x, t)dx. The evolution of n(x, t) when agents use the greedy algorithm above is,
for x < 1:
∂n(x, t)
∂t
= −Γn(x, t) + Γ
∫ x
0
dy
n(y, t)
1− y , (1)
where the second term in the RHS corresponds to agents in firms with score y < x choosing
their next firm in the interval [y, 1] with uniform probability. As written, Eq. (1) obviously
leads to a stationary state where all agents condense in the firm with the highest score (i.e.
x = 1 for N → ∞.) Some regularization is needed to make the problem non-trivial and
interesting. One realistic assumption is that each firm has a probability ϕ per unit time
to go under, in which case all its employees find new jobs with uniform probability in the
remaining firms. The defaulted firm is replaced by a new one with an x chosen uniformly
in [0, 1]. This leads to the following modified Master equation
∂n(x, t)
∂t
= −Γn(x, t) + Γ
∫ x
0
dy
n(y, t)
1− y − ϕn(x, t) + ϕ. (2)
Another, nearly equivalent interpretation, is to assume that new agents are injected in a
growing economy, with a constant rate ϕ and a uniform “deposition rate” among all firms.
We first look for a stationary solution to Eq. (2). Setting the LHS to zero and changing
variable to u = 1 − x, the stationary solution nst(u) must obey the following differential
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equation:
− Γn′st(u)− Γ
nst(u)
u
− ϕn′st(u) = 0. (3)
Introducing φ := ϕ/Γ, the normalized solution to the above equation reads:
nst(u) =
φ
1 + φ
1
u
1
1+φ
. (4)
This equation gives us the equilibrium fraction of agents in firms of quality x = 1− u.
We are now in position to derive the stationary distribution of the size s of firms. Since
the distribution of u’s is uniform, one has
P (s) =
∫ 1
0
du δ
(
s− φ
1 + φ
1
u
1
1+φ
)
= φ
(
φ
1 + φ
)1+φ
s−2−φ, (s > φ/(1 + φ)) (5)
which tends to a Zipf law when φ → 0. For companies, Axtell’s results translate to φ ≈
0.06. If one takes ϕ = 0.07/year as in [10], this suggests a reasonable search frequency of
Γ ≈ 1/year, although empirical data suggests a median job tenure of about 4 years in the
United States [11].
Note that our model is a continuous formulation of the SSR process studied by Corominas-
Murtra et al. in [12]. It is also closely related to the well known Simon model for growing
networks [13], where each new site links proportionally to the size of pre-existing clusters
with probability 1/(1 + φ) and creates a new singleton cluster with probability φ/(1 + φ).
One can in fact obtain the full time dependent solution of Eq. (2) as follows: we first write
n(u, t) = nst(u) +m(u, t)e
−ϕt with
∫
dum(u, t) = 0. Substituting in Eq. (2) one finds that
m(u, t) obeys exactly the un-regularized equation (1). The physical interpretation of this
equation is very simple: it describes the multiplicative process where the random variable
u(t+ dt) is equal to ut with probability 1− Γdt, and to atut with probability Γdt, where at
is a random variable with uniform distribution in [0, 1]. Hence, the quantity ℓ := − log(u)
is an additive random walk, for which the probability distribution evolves according to a
standard Fokker-Planck equation:
∂P (ℓ, t)
∂t
= −Γ∂P (ℓ, t)
∂ℓ
+
Γ
2
∂2P (ℓ, t)
∂ℓ2
(6)
Hence:
m(u, t) =
1
u
∫
dξ
M0(ξ)√
2πΓt
exp
(
−(log u+ ξ + Γt)
2
2Γt
)
, (7)
where M0(ξ) is the initial condition, such that um(u, 0) = M0(− log u).
4
Greedy but Myopic
In the model above, we assume that each agent preselects “better” firms and makes a
move with probability 1 if chosen. Assume now that if chosen our agent picks a firm at
random among all possible firms, and decides to move only if the chosen firm is better than
the current one. An agent in a firm of quality x = 1−u will thus only move with probability
u. The corresponding Master equation now reads:
∂n(x, t)
∂t
= −Γn(x, t)(1 − x) + Γ
∫ x
0
dy n(y, t)− ϕn(x, t) + ϕ. (8)
Its stationary solution now reads:
nst(u) =
φ(φ+ 1)
(u+ φ)2
, (9)
and the stationary distribution of firm sizes is:
P (s) =
∫ 1
0
du δ
(
s− φ(φ+ 1)
(u+ φ)2
)
=
√
φ(1 + φ)
2
s−3/2 (10)
where the last equality holds in the range s ∈ [φ/(1 + φ), 1 + 1/φ], outside which P (s) is
zero. Hence we find that in this model, the tail of the distribution is fatter than that of the
Zipf law. This (perhaps counter-intuitive) result is due to the fact that the time spent by
each agent in large firms is longer in the present setting, due to the myopic search algorithm
that becomes extremely inefficient when u→ 0.[14]
The full dynamics of the model can also be solved. Using Laplace transforms and the
method of characteristics, the deviation from equilibrium is given by:
m(u, t)e−ϕt = e−(u+φ)Γtm(u, 0) + Γte−(u+φ)Γt
∫ 1
u
dv m(v, 0), (11)
indicating that the system converges to the stationary state nst(u) after a time ∼ (uΓ)−1 for
u ≫ φ−1 and after a time ∼ ϕ−1 for small u’s. Hence, φ−1 acts as both a cut-off limiting
the values attainable by s, and as the relaxation time-scale of the system.
When ϕ = 0, Eq. (8) is in fact equivalent to a model studied by Barrat and Me´zard
in [15], where a particle moves in a landscape of randomly distributed energy levels. At
zero temperature, the energy can only go down and the Master equation of the Barrat and
Me´zard model reads
∂tp(E, t) = −p(E, t)
∫ E
−∞
dE ′ P(E ′) +
∫ ∞
E
dE ′ P(E ′)p(E ′, t) (12)
5
where p(E, t) is the probability to find the system at energy E at time t and P(E) is
the density of energy states. Eq. (12) is equivalent to our model through the mapping
u =
∫ E
−∞
dE ′ P(E ′). In terms of u, the exact dynamical solution is given by:
n(u, t) = e−Γutn(u, 0) + Γte−uΓt
∫ 1
u
du n(u, 0). (13)
This solution becomes universal at large times in the regime where u = z/Γt, z finite. One
finds:
n(u, t) = ΓtF(uΓt); F(z) = e−z. (14)
We also compute the distribution pt(τ) of trapping times τ :=
1
Γu
at time t, given by:
pt(τ) =
t
τ 2
e−
t
τ (15)
in full agreement with the findings of [15] in the appropriate limit t → ∞, τ → ∞ with
t/τ = O(1). In our context, the trapping time represents the time spent by an agent in a
firm before moving to another firm.
Interpolating between models
The two models above can be cast in a single framework, where agents spend a u-
dependent time τ(u) in their firm before looking for a better firm. The general Master
equation then reads
∂n(u, t)
∂t
= −n(u, t)
τ(u)
+
∫ 1
u
dv
n(v, t)
vτ(v)
− ϕn(u, t) + ϕ. (16)
The case τ(u) = Γ−1 corresponds to the Greedy model introduced previously, while the
Greedy but myopic model is when τ(u) = (Γu)−1. One can interpolate between the two
models by choosing τ(u) = Γ−1u−β. The stationary solution is then found to be, for β 6= 0,
nst(u) =
Zβ(φ)
(uβ + φ)1+
1
β
, (17)
where Zβ is a normalisation, and the solution given in Eq. (4) for β = 0. The corresponding
tail of firm size distribution behaves as P (s) ∼ s−β+2β+1 , recovering the Zipf law for β = 0 and
the s−3/2 behaviour for β = 1. Note that the above result continues to make sense as long
as β > −1.
6
FIG. 1. Log-log plots of P>(s) :=
∫∞
s ds
′P (s′) ∼ s−µ, with µ := 1β+1 and nst(u) as given by
numerical simulations along with their corresponding fits to the analytical results.
THE MULTI-CRITERION CASE
Let us formally define the model by specifying the rules according to which an agent in
a firm characterized by a vector of scores ~x = (x1, . . . , xK) can move into a new firm with
scores ~y = (y1, . . . , yK). Setting again ui = 1 − xi and vi = 1 − yi, the transition is allowed
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when there exists a subset (i1, . . . , iM) ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that:
vi1 < ui1
...
viM < uiM .
(18)
If this is the case, the corresponding transition matrix W~u→~v is set to unity, otherwise
W~u→~v = 0.
Defining n(~u, t) as the density of agents in firms of score ~u at time t, the general Master
equation we will consider is
∂n(~u, t)
∂t
= −Γn(~u, t)ωβK,M(~u) + Γ
∫
W~v→~u 6=0
d~v n(~v, t)ωβ−1K,M(~u)− ϕn(~u, t) + ϕ, (19)
where
ωK,M(~u) =
∫
[0,1]K
d~vW~u→~v (20)
is the total volume accessible for ~u. The case β = 0 corresponds to the “greedy” algorithm
of the previous section, while β = 1 corresponds to its “myopic” counterpart.
In the stationary state, one can map models with different values of β in the limit ϕ→ 0
by writing:
nst,β 6=0(~u) ∝ nst,β=0(~u)
ωK,M(~u)β
. (21)
Grand Slam
Let us first consider the case M = K, i.e. when all scores must improve for the agent to
change firm. In this case, the available volume ωK,K(~u) is easy to compute and reads:
ωK,K(~u) =
K∏
i=1
ui. (22)
The stationary distribution then takes a factorized form, which for β = 0 reads:
nst(~u) =
K∏
i=1
φ
1 + φ
1
u
1
1+φ
i
. (23)
This result is expected, because each of the K scores, in this setting, follows an independent
one-dimensional greedy process.
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The stationary firm size distribution is given, for β = 0, by
P (s) =
∫
[0,1]K
d~u δ

s− K∏
i=1
φ
1 + φ
1
u
1
1+φ
i

 . (24)
This can be computed by first introducing the following function:
FK(t) =
∫
[0,1]K
d~u δ
(
t−
K∏
i=1
ui
)
. (25)
Integrating over – say – uK , one easily derives the following recursion relation:
FK(t) =
∫ 1
t
ds
FK−1(s)
s
, (26)
which solves as
FK(t) =
(log t−1)K−1
(K − 1)! . (27)
Injecting this expression into Eq. (24) we thus find:
P (s) =
∫
dtFK(t)δ
(
s− AKt−
1
1+φ
)
, (28)
with AK = φ
K/(1 + φ)K . The final result is a Zipf law with a K dependent logarithmic
correction:
P (s→∞) ∝
(
log
s
AK
)K−1
s−2−φ. (29)
Marginal distributions
In the following, we consider M < K. As we will see, no regularization is needed in this
case since agents can always “escape” from good firms. Hence, we set ϕ = 0 henceforth.
Taking the distribution of the new scores ~v conditioned on the previous scores ~u, and in-
tegrating over (v1, . . . , vK−1) allows us to compute the marginal distribution of vK , P (vK),
given ~u
P (vK |~u) = θ(uK − vK)ωK−1,M−1(~uK¯) + θ(vK − uK)ωK−1,M(~uK¯)
uKωK−1,M−1(~uK¯) + (1− uK)ωK−1,M(~uK¯)
=
θ(uK − vK) + ν(~uK¯)θ(vK − uK)
uK + ν(~uK¯)(1− uK)
,
(30)
where θ(x) = 1 for x > 0 and zero otherwise, ~uK¯ = (u1, . . . , uK−1) and
ν(~uK¯) :=
ωK−1,M
ωK−1,M−1
(31)
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where ν =
ωK−1,M (~uK¯)
ωK−1,M−1(~uK¯)
.
Assuming that ν converges to a constant value ν∗ (which is in fact only true in the limit
K →∞, see below), the stationary marginal distribution of scores Pst(v) must verify
Pst(v) =
∫ 1
v
du
Pst(u)
u+ ν∗(1− u) + ν
∗
∫ v
0
du
Pst(u)
u+ ν∗(1− u) (32)
which has a (normalized) solution:
Pst(u) =
ν∗ − 1
log(ν∗)
1
u+ (1− ν∗)u (33)
We now show that in the large K limit, ν∗ can be self-consistently computed and only
depends on the ratio α = M
K
.
The large K limit
We first note that the volume ωK,M(~u) can be represented exactly using binary spin
variables σk = ±1, as
ωK,M(~u) =
∫
[0,1]K
d~vW~u→~v
=
∑
{σk=±1}
K∏
k=1
u
1+σk
2
k (1− uk)
1−σk
2 θ
(
K∑
k=1
σk − (2M −K)
)
.
(34)
Using the Fourier representation of the Dirac delta function, one finds:
ωK,M(~u) ∝
∫ 1
2α−1
dµ
∫
dλ e−iµλ
∑
{σk=±1}
exp
(
K∑
k=1
(h(uk) + iλ) σk +
log(uk(1− uk))
2
)
(35)
where h(u) = 1
2
log
(
u
1−u
)
.
Now we are left with computing the partition function of a system of Ising spins with local
fields h(uk) + iλ. Summing over all configurations {σk = ±1} we find that each coordinate
contributes to the partition function with a term (cosh(h(uk) + iλ)). After a few algebraic
manipulations we obtain
ωK,M(~u) ∝
∫ 1
2α−1
dµ
∫
dλ exp
(
K∑
k=1
(
log
(
uk + e
−2iλ(1− uk)
)− iλ(µ− 1))
)
(36)
In the large K limit two simplifications occur. First, one can replace the sum
∑K
k=1 f(uk)
with the integral K
∫ 1
0
duP (u)f(u) when f is an arbitrary regular function. Second, one can
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calculate the integral over λ using a saddle-point method. Hence:
ωK,M(~u) ∝
∫ 1
2α−1
dµ expK
(∫ 1
0
duP (u)
(
log
(
u+ e−2λ
∗(µ)(1− u))− λ∗(µ)(µ− 1))) (37)
where λ∗(µ) satisfies the saddle-point equation:
µ =
∫ 1
0
duP (u)
tanh(λ∗) + 2u− 1
1 + tanh(λ∗)(2u− 1) . (38)
Assuming that P (u) has reached its stationary limit Pst(u) given by Eq. (33), we therefore
find:
µ =


2(ν∗−1)ε log(ε)−(ε−1) log(ν∗)(ν∗+ε)
(ε−1) log(ν∗)(ε−ν∗)
if ε 6= ν∗
2
log(ν∗)
− ν∗+1
ν∗−1
if ε = ν∗
(39)
with ε := e−2λ
∗
. This last equation must be solved for λ∗ for a given pair of values µ, ν∗.
The remaining integral over µ is again estimated using a second saddle-point, leading to:
µ∗(α, ν∗) = argmax
µ∈[2α−1,1]
(∫ 1
0
duPst(u)
(
log
(
u+ e−2λ
∗(µ)(1− u))− λ∗(µ)(µ− 1)))
:= argmax
µ∈[2α−1,1]
g(µ, ν∗)
(40)
and we obtain our final result for ωK,M(~u):
ωK,M(~u) ∝ exp
(
K
∫ 1
0
duPst(u)
(
log
(
u+ e−2λ
∗(µ∗)(1− u))− λ∗(µ∗)(µ∗ − 1))) (41)
One can check that for all ν ∈ [0, 1], the function g(µ) is decreasing in the interval [0, 1], and
has a maximum for µ = 0 with g(0) = 0 as depicted in Fig. 2 for ν = ε or ν = 1. Assuming
that the saddle point is µ∗ = 2α − 1 when α > 1
2
and µ∗ = 0 otherwise, one can compute
the relevant volume ratio for large K and for α > 1
2
using Eq. (41):
ωK−1,M
ωK−1,M
=
ωK−1,α(1+ 1K )
ωK−1,α+α−1
K
≈ e−2λ∗(µ∗) := ε∗. (42)
validating thus our assumption for the saddle-point. Setting ν∗ = ε∗ in Eq. (39), we finally
obtain an implicit expression for ν∗:
1− 2α = ν
∗ + 1
ν∗ − 1 −
2
log(ν∗)
when α >
1
2
ν∗ = 1 when α ≤ 1
2
.
(43)
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FIG. 2. Plot of g(µ) as computed for ν = 1 and ν = ε. Note that the maximum is reached in both
cases for g(0) = 0, allowing one to establish the result in Eq. (43).
We compare our analytical results with numerical simulations in Figs. 3 and 4. The
shape of Pst(u) describes very well the numerical results even for small values of K. The
value of ν∗, however, is only slowly reached when K →∞.
When α→ 1 (i.e. when M → K), the solution for ν∗ is exponentially small:
ν∗ ≈ e− 11−α , (44)
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− 1 .0 − 0.5 0.0 0.5   .0
µ = 2α − 
0.0
02
04
06
08
0

∗
(µ
)
Increasing K
Analyt ical
Sim ulat ion
Sim ulat ion, K= 	5
Sim ulat ion, K= 8
FIG. 3. Plot of ν∗ computed using the empirical transition matrix from simulations with K =
2 . . . 15 vs. the analytical value given in Eq. (43). Note that the empirical values get closer to the
analytical curve as K gets larger, as shown by the dashed lines over the values for K = 15 and
K = 8.
whereas when α → 1
2
from above, ν∗ ≈ 1 − 6(2α− 1) and tends to 1. When α < 1
2
, ν∗ = 1
and Pst(u) = 1. Hence, in the case where M < K/2, the distribution of scores is uniform in
the large time limit: the selection process is too weak to induce any differentiation between
firms.
13
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
uk
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
P
s
(u
k
)
Analytical solution with empirical ν ∗ =0.116
Simulation
FIG. 4. Plot of empirical and analytical Pst(u) for M = 8 and K = 12. The value of ν
∗ was again
determined using the empirical transition matrix and plugged into Eq. (33).
Since in the large K limit the dynamics of scores decouple, the full stationary distribution
nst(~u) is simply given by
nst(~u) ∝
K∏
i=1
1
(ui + (1− ui)ν∗)1+β
(45)
This is the central result of this section. Notice that the re-injection mechanism that we
introduced in the mono-criterion case is not needed here since ν∗ > 0 whenever α < 1.
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When α → 1, ν∗ → 0 and the stationary distribution is extremely close to the result for
M = K, see Eq. (23) for φ = 0.
Now the distribution of firm sizes can be computed as
P (s) =
∫
[ν;1]K
d~v δ
(
s− AK
K∏
i=1
vi
)
=
∫
[νK ;1]
dt δ
(
n− AKt−1
)
FK(t, ν)
(46)
with vi = ui + (1 − ui)ν∗, AK =
(
ν∗−1
log(ν∗)
)K
. We have introduced the function FK(t, ν) =∫
[ν;1]K
d~u δ(t−∏ ui) that satisfies:

F1(t, ν) = θ(t− ν)FK(t, ν) = ∫ min( tν ,1)t dss FK−1(s, ν), (47)
which can be computed explicitly for small values of K:[16]
F2(t, ν) =θ(t− ν) log(t−1) + θ (ν − t) θ
(
t− ν2) log( t
ν2
)
2F3(t, ν) =θ (t− ν) log2(t−1) + θ (ν − t) θ
(
t− ν2)
(
log
(ν
t
)2
+ log
(
t
ν2
)2)
+ θ
(
ν2 − t) θ (t− ν3) log2( t
ν3
)
.
(48)
One can convince one self that this structure generalises for larger Ks, with contributions
logK−1
(
νj
t
)
(K−1)!
and
logK−1( t
νj+1
)
(K−1)!
when t ∈ [νj+1; νj ], j = 1 . . .K − 1. In the end intervals one
finds FK(t, ν) =
(logK−1(t−1))
(K−1)!
and FK(t) =
logK−1( t
νK
)
(K−1)!
for νK < t < νK−1. Finally, FK(t, ν) = 0
for t < νK . Although quite complicated, one therefore finds that FK(t, ν) is a piece-wise
polynomial function of log t−1 in the whole interval. Hence, the distribution P (s), given by:
P (s) ∝

s
−2FK(
AK
s
, ν) for s < s∗ = AK
ν∗K
0 for s > s∗ = AK
ν∗K
,
(49)
is a Zipf-law modulated by powers of logarithms in a broad interval that extends up to
s∗ ≃
ν→0
(
ν log
(
1
ν
))−K
. The important point here is that as soon as ν∗ < 1, the upper cut-off
s∗ becomes very large when K is large, all the more so when α is close to unity. An example
of a plot of P (s) is given in Fig. 5.
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P
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Numerical result
Zipf, P(s)∝ s−2
FIG. 5. Log-log plot of P (s) for K = 5 and M = 4, compared to the Zipf law s−2. The figure
was plotted using the numerical value of ν∗ ≃ 0.036. Note the modulation introduced by the
logarithmic corrections encoded in the function FK(u, ν).
CONCLUSION
We have introduced a simple model of firm/city/etc. growth based on the idea that agents
choose to switch from entity A to entity B depending on a multi-item criterion: whenever
entity B fares better that entity A on a subset of M items out of K, the agent originally
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in A moves to B. We have solved the model analytically in the cases K = 1 and K → ∞.
The resulting stationary distribution of sizes is generically a Zipf-law provided M > K/2.
When M ≤ K/2, no selection occurs and the size distribution remains thin-tailed. In the
special case M = K, some regularisation process must be introduced to prevent the whole
system from condensating into the “best” entity. Introducing a small probability φ that
each entity defaults and redistributes all its agents in surving entitities, one finds that the
stationary distribution has a power-law tail that becomes a Zipf-law when φ → 0. The
approach to the stationary state has also been characterized, with strong similarities with a
simple “aging” model considered by Barrat & Me´zard [15]. Although our model for K = 1
looks superficially similar to those considered by Gualdi & Mandel [8] and Axtell [9], we
have not been able to elicit a precise mapping between these models, and more generally
with the slew of other mechanisms that lead to Zipf-laws.
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